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Abstract 
Despite the rapid progress in the development of automated 
vehicles, formal verification of the full automated driving process is 
unsolved. A promising approach investigated in the EU project 
UnCoVerCPS is the combination of online and offline verification as 
well as testing steps. The methods developed in UnCoVerCPS are 
applicable to many safety critical, cyber physical systems. As a 
specific use case, we investigate a system, which facilitates safe 
cooperation of automated vehicles. Leveraging a formal proof on a 
validated vehicle dynamics model and by negotiating exclusive 
access to subsets of the drivable area via Car-to-Car 
communication, the freedom of collisions and safe operation in other 
respects are ascertained online and during operation of the vehicle. 
One of the goals of UnCoVerCPS is to demonstrate applicability of 
the online verification approach in a cooperative driving scenario with 
two life-sized vehicles. In this paper we discuss the detailed 
approach and preliminary results en route to the physical realization. 
1. Introduction
A significant challenge in automated vehicle design is validation and 
verification. Purely test-based validation approaches tend to require 
high numbers of test kilometers, which can be cost and time 
intensive. Under assumption of a stochastic model, a recent study 
estimates that showing with 95% confidence a fatality rate of 
automated cars within 20% of the fatality rate of human operated 
cars would require 8.8 billion miles of driving [1]. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to transfer results to unforeseen driving situations or new 
software configurations.  
Results on formal correctness proves exist, but often consider very 
limited application scopes or very abstract problem formulations. An 
approach for safely entering an intersection is presented in [2]. In [3], 
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automated cruise control is formally verified by automated theorem 
proving, but under the assumptions that all vehicles cooperate and 
communicate, and that no unexpected vehicle appears. A verified 
synthesis for driving assistance in traffic merging is presented in [4], 
but with limited consideration of the underlying dynamics required for 
fully automated driving. Offline verification approaches have the 
problem that they have to account for all values of a high number of 
environmental variables inherent in the application, which is 
especially difficult in the combination of mixed continuous and 
discrete dynamical systems. The number of variables can be 
drastically reduced, if a proof of correctness is attempted for only a 
specific instance of traffic situations – this though requires repeated 
evaluation for each decision, on-the-fly and during operation of the 
vehicle [5]. 
We present an approach that uses a combination of offline- and 
online computation steps to verify on-the-fly that a certain control 
action of a vehicle is safe to execute. The pre-computation of verified 
motion primitives in an offline step allows replacing time intensive 
online computations with simple look-ups. Safety is proven by 
calculating an emergency maneuver, which takes the vehicle to a 
safe state after execution of the control action, without intersecting 
worst case predictions of other vehicles. Using worst case 
predictions for the behavior of other traffic participants is in some 
situations conservative, yet it avoids the complexity of game theory 
or differential games and it allows using very general assumptions 
about other traffic participants. The presented approach is 
formulated especially for cooperative lane-changing situations and 
makes no unrealistic assumptions on communication protocols. 
Changing the constraint sets used for emergency maneuver planning 
allows to easily extend the approach to other automated driving 
applications or vehicle capabilities. The proposed cooperation 
scheme considers only direct cooperation in a 1 to n relationship. 
The approach is intended as a safe basis for more complex, group-
based interactions, as proposed in [6] and further pursued in the 
DFG project CoInCiDE. The next section gives an overview of our 
approach and the following sections detail the software modules 
involved in realization. 
2. Approach
We propose a supervisory module, which enforces safety of 
cooperative automated driving by filtering the communication 
exchange between vehicles, as well as filtering the driving 
commands sent to each vehicle’s actuators. 
Fig. 1: Layered vehicle control architecture with Supervisor 
We make use of a typical, layered architecture, fig. 1, structured 
analogously to the driving tasks defined by Donges [7]. At the lowest 
level, the physical vehicle accepts control inputs from a stabilizing 
control layer. Higher-level driving skills on the short term guidance / 
maneuvering layer as well as the navigation layer are subsumed in a 
“black box” termed High-level Behaviors. The contained modules are 
thought to handle normal, every-day driving situations by providing 
nominal set-points, which lead to a good average-case driving 
performance by such measures as duration of travel, fuel 
consumption, comfort, etc. We will not focus on the inner workings of 
the High-level Behaviors, but rather assume them to be given 
according to the state of the art. The black box of High-level 
behaviors is expected, but not required to provide new, desired set 
points 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 with a fixed rate 1/𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝, (we use 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 = 0.1𝑠𝑠). In our specific 
application, a set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 is a reference trajectory of duration 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝. 
The Low-level Controller executes at a fixed rate 1/𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 (e.g. here 
using 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐 = 0.005𝑠𝑠) and stabilizes the vehicle, by regulating the 
vehicle’s deviation from the set point (reference trajectory). The Low-
level Controller is assumed to be a “white box” module with known 
equations, as it is submitted to formal analysis in order to compute 
bounds on the closed-loop performance of the system, see sec. 3 
and sec. 4. 
In each vehicle, which is following the presented approach, a 
Supervisor module is inserted between High-level Behaviors and 
Low-level Controller. Every time frame of length 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝, the Supervisor 
tries to find a proof of safety for the current desired set point. If 
successful, it passes the desired set point to the Low-Level 
Controller. This is defined as the nominal operation. Otherwise it 
supplies a surrogate - an emergency set point, for which a proof of 
safety is known. This is henceforth referred to as emergency 
operation. 
To facilitate cooperation between automated vehicles, we assume 
that information is passed between the vehicles’ respective High-
level Behaviors via wireless car-to-car messages. A Car-to-car 
communication module (C2C) realizes the transmission. We require 
the C2C module to guarantee that messages are neither altered nor 
faked (e.g. by employing asymmetric encryption). Albeit, a guarantee 
for successful or timely transmission is not required, as such a 
performance could not be reliably provided by contemporary C2C 
protocols such as the ETSI GeoNetworking protocol [8]. Agreements 
between vehicles are allowed to be safety critical. Therefore the 
message content has to be standardized and known to the 
Supervisor and all safety critical messages have to be passed 
through the Supervisor. The Supervisor keeps track of incoming 
messages and transfers outgoing messages only, if it is able to show 
that the contained agreement is safe. 
2.1 The Supervisor Module 
According to the proposed concept, the Supervisor proves safety of 
a desired set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 by constructing an emergency maneuver, 
which can be appended after execution of 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 and which guides the 
vehicle to a safe terminal state, (e.g. stand still in a specific lane or 
emergency lane). The central part of the Supervisor, fig. 2, is a 
Planner, which constructs the emergency maneuvers as a 
concatenation of atomic motion primitives supplied by a Maneuver 
Database. The Maneuver Database specifies: (1) A finite set of 
motion primitives and their according set points (2) A guaranteed 
over-approximation of the 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡 occupancy of each motion primitive, 
meaning the set of positions in 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡, which could be covered by any 
part of the vehicle body during execution of the motion primitive. (3) 
A graph structure that defines admissible orders of execution of the 
motion primitives. (4) Entry conditions for starting an emergency 
maneuver. The Planner tests the motion primitives’ 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡 
occupancies against constraints supplied by the Constraints module 
and thus creates a tree of admissible emergency maneuvers. 
Eventually it finds a valid chain of motion primitives, which starts with 
the nominal set point and leads to a safe state. The chain of 
reference trajectories is designated 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 ≔ (𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒,1𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒,2𝑖𝑖 … 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ).  
 
Fig. 2: Sub-components of the Supervisor 
 
If such a solution 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 is found, it is passed on to the Dispatcher, a 
sub-process of the Supervisor, which runs in parallel to the Planner. 
The Dispatcher oversees the correct timing of presenting a validated 
set point to the Low-level Control module. If 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 is available on time, 
the Dispatcher will replace its previous 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖−1 with 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 and send the 
new first entry 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  to the Low-Level Control. This constitutes the 
case of normal operation: Each update, the old desired set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  
is directly succeeded by a new desired set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖+1. The High-level 
Behavior’s set points are therefore passed through the Supervisor 
module with a delay of 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 and execution of an emergency maneuver 
is regularly postponed. In contrast, the emergency case occurs, if the 
Dispatcher does not receive 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 on time. This could be provoked for 
numerous reasons, such as a software or timing error in the High-
level Behaviors, excessive complexity of the scene presented to the 
Motion Planner, a software error in the Motion Planner or in general 
an unsafe set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑. In the case of such an emergency, the 
Dispatcher continues execution of the previous 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖−1, consequently 
transitioning from the last desired set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  to the first emergency 
set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒,1 and so forth. Accordingly the full 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 will be executed 
until the vehicle has reached the safe terminal state, or until a new 
and safe desired set point is available.  
The proof of correctness of the Supervisor module hinges on the set 
point switching of the Dispatcher: Assuming that at a certain time the 
Dispatcher is initialized with a first, valid emergency maneuver, one 
can show by induction that the vehicle will subsequently execute only 
such set points, which are leading to safe states, as witnessed by the 
according emergency maneuver.  
Of course, one has to guarantee that an emergency maneuver, 
which is based on observations at the beginning of motion planning, 
will remain safe during execution of the emergency maneuver up to 
reaching its terminal state. Depending on the initial velocity and the 
number of required steering actions, environment predictions must 
be guaranteed to hold for an interval of several seconds. The 
Constraints module makes use of worst-case assumptions based on 
physical bounds and simple traffic rules to achieve reliable 
predictions, see sec. 5. These predictions are presented as 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡-
constraints to the Motion Planner. Furthermore, it has to account for 
safety critical agreements between cooperating vehicles: The 
observation-based 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡-constraints are tightened by constraints 
from the Occupied set, which represents promises made by the ego-
vehicle to other cooperating vehicles through an outgoing Promise 
message. In a symmetric fashion, Promise messages received by 
the ego-vehicle are stored in the Promised set: The Constraints 
module relaxes the 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡-constraints using the information contained 
in the Promised set.   
In our approach, vehicles are allowed to build their safety critical 
emergency maneuver based on information exchanged with C2C 
messages. Therefore Promise messages have to constitute a 
contract that may not be violated under any circumstances. While a 
High-level Behavior might decide that it is desirable (according to 
whichever metric) to answer a Request message with a Promise 
message, the Supervisor investigates inside the Contract Validation 
module whether a Promise is safe for the ego vehicle and whether it 
can be honored under all circumstances. Only then, and after saving 
the Promise information in the Occupied set, transmission is allowed, 
see sec. 5. Looking closer at fig. 2, it is apparent that the Supervisor 
does not handle outgoing Request messages. This is due to the fact 
that Requests are not safety critical: High-Level Behaviors are free to 
issue Requests in any manner that seems appropriate to them. 
In order to create a reliable, deterministic interface to the vehicle 
dynamics two steps have to be taken during an offline design phase. 
First, a closed loop vehicle model with appropriate disturbance 
bounds has to be chosen.  In sec. 3 the model is defined and the 
choice of bounds in relation to the physical vehicle is described. 
Based on the disturbed ego vehicle model, sec. 4 describes 
computation of a Maneuver Database, which provides deterministic 
action sets for nominal and emergency maneuvers. Online, during 
operation of the vehicle, a set of constraints is computed, which 
takes vehicle cooperation into account. The interaction and 
cooperation scheme is described in sec. 5. A maneuver planner, 
briefly covered in sec. 6, computes safe emergency maneuvers, 
which avoid intersection with the constraint set. 
 
3. Vehicle Model with Error Bounds 
The goal of this section is to provide a validated mathematical model 
for the vehicle movement. Given the nature of the physical system, 
the relation between system and mathematical model can only be 
established by a finite set of examples. Conformance Testing is 
employed to find and quantify the differences between model and 
system, based on a set of exemplary test drives.  
We use a planar bicycle model to describe the vehicle motion. Tire 
forces are modeled as linear equations, yet the overall model is 
nonlinear in the longitudinal velocity and the kinematic equations. 
The vehicle state 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℝ6 is chosen as  𝑥𝑥 = �𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝜓𝜓, 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 , 𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 ,𝜔𝜔�T, 
including the vehicle position, the orientation, the relative longitudinal 
and lateral velocity as well as the rotational speed. The input space 
is 𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥ℝ2, 𝑢𝑢 = (𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 , 𝛿𝛿)T including the desired longitudinal acceleration 
and the steering angle. The parameter vector is 
𝑝𝑝 = (𝜗𝜗, 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 , 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇) with 𝜗𝜗 = 𝑚𝑚/𝐽𝐽 the ratio of mass and rotational 
inertia, 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 , 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 the relative front and rear tire stiffness, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 the distance 
from center of gravity to front and rear axle with 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏. In the 
following, the constants 𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 = −𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏/𝐿𝐿 and 𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 = −𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎/𝐿𝐿 are 
used. A disturbance acting on the vehicle is defined as 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 =
�𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 , 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 , 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅�T𝑥𝑥ℝ3, which contains three error forces divided by the 
vehicle mass, 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 for combined longitudinal errors and 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦 and 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦 for 
front and rear lateral error terms.  
Def. 3.1: The vehicle’s differential equation is defined as ?̇?𝑥 =
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥,𝑢𝑢, 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑) = (𝑓𝑓1, … ,𝑓𝑓6)T with: 
𝑓𝑓1 = 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 cos(𝜓𝜓) − 𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 sin(𝜓𝜓) , 𝑓𝑓2 = 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 sin(𝜓𝜓) + 𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 cos(𝜓𝜓), (3.1) 
𝑓𝑓3 = 𝜔𝜔, 𝑓𝑓4 = 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 + 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥, (3.2) 
𝑓𝑓5 = 𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹  �𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 + 𝑎𝑎𝜔𝜔𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 − 𝑏𝑏𝜔𝜔𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 − 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥𝜔𝜔 + 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅 , (3.3) 
𝑓𝑓6 = 𝑎𝑎𝜗𝜗𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹  �𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 + 𝑎𝑎𝜔𝜔𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 − 𝛿𝛿� − 𝑏𝑏𝜗𝜗𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 − 𝑏𝑏𝜔𝜔𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥  + 𝑎𝑎𝜗𝜗𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 − 𝑏𝑏𝜗𝜗𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑅𝑅 . (3.4) 
The parameter vector has been matched to our physical test vehicle, 
by minimizing the error between a test-drive recording (open loop) 
and the parametrized model. Fig. 3 shows a comparison between 
lateral forces estimated from the recording (blue) and the fitted 
relative tire stiffness (red). The parameters 𝜗𝜗 = 0.64 𝑚𝑚−2, 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 =10.8 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑−1, 𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅 = 17.8 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑−1,𝑎𝑎 = 1.16𝑚𝑚, 𝑏𝑏 = 1.54𝑚𝑚, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 = 0.8 ∙9.81𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠−2 are used. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Cornering stiffness (red) matched to test drive data (blue) 
 
3.1 Low-Level Control 
Def. 3.2: A reference trajectory 𝜏𝜏:ℝ → ℝ10 is defined as a solution to 
the initial value problem (IVP) for an error-free vehicle model (𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 ≡ 0) 
with the reference state vector 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 = �𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝜓𝜓, 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 , 𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 ,𝜔𝜔, 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 , 𝛿𝛿,𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2�T 
containing the reference input 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 , 𝛿𝛿 and the reference input change 
𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2 and with the differential equation ?̇?𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 = 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓): 
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 ≔ (𝑓𝑓T,𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2, 0,0)T (3.5) 
Def. 3.3: The feedback control function makes use of a nonlinear 
transformation of a control point in front of the vehicle similar to [16]. 
The control point is located a distance 𝜆𝜆 ∈ ℝ2 relative to the vehicle 
and a reference control point is located 𝜆𝜆 relative to the reference 
vehicle. The control error is defined as the difference between both 
control points, expressed in the local coordinates of the reference 
vehicle, using the rotation matrix 𝑅𝑅(𝜓𝜓) = �cos (𝜓𝜓) −sin (𝜓𝜓)sin (𝜓𝜓) cos (𝜓𝜓) �: 
𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ≔ 𝑅𝑅�−𝑥𝑥3
𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓� ∙ �𝑥𝑥1:2 − 𝑥𝑥1:2𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 + 𝑅𝑅(𝑥𝑥3) ∙ 𝜆𝜆� − 𝜆𝜆. (3.6) 
Def. 3.4: Including a feed-forward and a linear PD feed-back term, 
the control function 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑐𝑐(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓) is defined: 
𝑐𝑐 ≔ 𝑥𝑥7:8𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 − 𝐾𝐾 (𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡T , ?̇?𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡T )T. (3.7) 
Def. 3.5: The closed-loop system used for conformance testing and 
reachability analysis is defined as the differential equation 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 with the 
exogenous disturbance 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 and the measurement error 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥ℝ6: 
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑) = 𝑓𝑓 �𝑥𝑥, 𝑐𝑐 �𝑥𝑥 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)� , 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑� (3.8) 
 
3.2 Conformance Testing 
The goal of conformance testing is to validate the vehicle dynamics 
model and to bound the size of measurement errors 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 
disturbance 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 that have to be expected during closed loop operation 
of the vehicle. Given a parametrized vehicle model 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐, the error sets 
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 and 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 with ∀𝑡𝑡: 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 ∧ 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑  and some recordings of 
test drives of the actual vehicle, the conformance testing step tries to 
invalidate the hypothesis that the combination {𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐,𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 ,𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑} suffices to 
explain the relevant physical processes. If the hypothesis is falsified, {𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 ,𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒,𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑} has to be adapted in the quest for a reliable model. If the 
hypothesis cannot be falsified, a certain degree of confidence in the 
model is provided, according to the test cases’ density of coverage of 
the operational regime of the vehicle. Roehm et. al. [9] describe 
different types of conformance relations between model and physical 
process. Here, we make use of trace conformance: Given a 
measurement trace 𝑌𝑌 ∈ ℝ𝑡𝑡×𝑘𝑘 containing measurements 𝑦𝑦 ∈ ℝ𝑡𝑡 at 
times 𝑇𝑇 ∈ ℝ𝑘𝑘, the model is conformant, if traces 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘  and 𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘 
exist, for which holds ∀𝑖𝑖 < 𝑘𝑘: 
�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖+1� = �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖� + ∫ 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐�𝜏𝜏, 𝑥𝑥(𝜏𝜏), 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒,𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑,𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 . (3.9) 
We formulate and solve a constrained optimal control formulation 
with local linearization of 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐, in order to find a valid pair 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒, 𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑 for each 
𝑌𝑌. First results haven achieved on real test-drive recordings, 
although these are matched against an open loop vehicle model, 
instead of using the ultimately desired closed loop formulation. In this 
preliminary formulation, 𝑢𝑢 has been replaced by the measured 
actuator values. As an exemplary test suite, a double lane change 
maneuver has been executed at 10m/s for five times. Fig. 4 displays 
the estimated state and actuator measurement error traces as well 
as disturbance traces. The error traces are conformant with the test 
drive recordings according to the error bounds displayed in red. The 
bounds derived for the measurement errors are ?̂?𝑒𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌 = 0.05𝑚𝑚, ?̂?𝑒𝜓𝜓 = 0.5°, ?̂?𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 = 0.1𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠−1, ?̂?𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 = 0.1𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠−1, ?̂?𝑒𝜔𝜔 = 0.8°𝑠𝑠−1, ?̂?𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 = 0.1𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠−2, ?̂?𝑒𝛿𝛿 =
1° and ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑥𝑥 = 0.049𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠−2, ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓 = 0.028𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠−2, ?̂?𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 = 0.021𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠−2 for the 
disturbance errors. 
 
Fig. 4: Conformant error traces for five executions of a double lane 
change maneuver 
4. Maneuver Database 
In our application, the Maneuver Database is used by the Planner as 
a deterministic, offline computed control interface to the originally 
non-deterministic motion of the physical vehicle. This is achieved by 
selecting a set of short, exemplary motions (reference trajectories) 
and using Reachability Analysis [10] to compute an upper bound on 
the disturbed vehicle’s maximum possible deviation from a 
reference. Adding the extent of the vehicle body to this upper bound 
yields the area, which has to be reserved for collision-free execution 
of a so called motion primitive. A motion planner may then construct 
a sufficiently long emergency maneuver as a concatenation of short, 
collision-free motion primitives.  
 
 
Fig. 5: Parallelotope hull of reachable sets (blue) and covered 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡 
area, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (black), for an exemplary motion primitive 
 
Def. 4.1: A motion primitive 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is a tuple consisting of a reference 
trajectory 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖:ℝ → ℝ10, the number of sampled time steps 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, an 
ordered list of reachable state sets 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖[∙], 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖[𝑗𝑗] ⊂ ℝ𝑡𝑡, with 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖[1] = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 
the start set and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖[𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖] = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 the final reachable state set of the 
motion primitive, with one reachable set per time step, as well as the 
motion primitive’s 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡-hull 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ⊂ ℝ3:   
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ≔ {𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 ,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖[∙],𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖}. (4.1) 
An exemplary motion primitive is displayed in fig. 5. 
Def. 4.2: A Maneuver Database is defined similar to [11] as a tuple: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ≔ {𝑀𝑀,∆,𝑀𝑀0,𝐺𝐺}, (4.2) 
where 𝑀𝑀 = {𝑚𝑚1,𝑚𝑚2, … } is a finite set of motion primitives, ∆⊆ 𝑀𝑀 × 𝑀𝑀 
is the set of directed transitions between motion primitives, 𝑀𝑀0 ⊆ 𝑀𝑀 
is the set of possible initial motion primitives and 𝐺𝐺 ⊆ 𝑀𝑀 is the set of 
final motion primitives, which lead to a standstill of the vehicle. 
Def. 4.3: The Maneuver Database is sound, if all states contained in 
a motion primitive’s final reachable set 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓 continue to be pursued 
after a transition to the next motion primitive, i.e. if the first motion’s 
final set is completely contained in the second motion’s start set:  (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗) ∈ ∆ ⟹ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 ⊆ 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆 (4.3) 
In order to create a sound and useful maneuver database, three 
questions have to be answered: How to facilitate the nominal set 
point selection from a continuous manifold? How to select the 
exemplary motion primitives, given that a finite number is required 
with which a maximally diverse set of emergency maneuvers should 
be constructible? And how to interconnect the motion primitives, in 
order to fulfill eq. (4.3)? These questions will be discussed in the 
following. 
 
4.1 Sampling the Nominal Set Point Space 
We want the Supervisor module to impose as little constraints as 
possible on the High-Level Decision modules. To facilitate operation 
in a usual manner, High-Level Decision modules should be allowed 
to select nominal set points from a continuous set. It has been shown 
previously [11] that a continuous range of reference trajectories may 
be considered in the reachability analysis, by incorporating both the 
actual vehicle’s state space as well as the reference state space into 
the reachability analysis. Instead of following this approach for the 
complete MDB, we here allow continuous reference trajectory sets 
only for the entry points of the MDB, e.g. the nominal set points.  
Def. 4.4: A set point bundle is defined by a set of initial reference 
states, 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓(0) ⊂ ℝ10, where one reference trajectory 𝜏𝜏 is the 
solution to an IVP with 𝜏𝜏(0) ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓(0) and ?̇?𝜏 = 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓(𝜏𝜏). 
In order to keep a grip on the number of bundles, which are required 
for a gap-free coverage of the ten-dimensional reference trajectory 
space, two observations are useful: First, the dynamics are invariant 
to the dimensions 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝜓𝜓. Therefore a single sample 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑌𝑌 = 𝜓𝜓 = 0 
is sufficient. Second, it is desirable to operate the system near a 
steady state surface, which allows constraining 𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 ,𝜔𝜔, 𝛿𝛿 according to 
the choice of 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥  and a steady-state acceleration 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆.  
Def. 5.5: Using interval sets 𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑 ≔ 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  + {[0,Δ𝑑𝑑], [Δ𝑑𝑑, 2Δ𝑑𝑑], … , [(𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 −1)Δ𝑑𝑑, 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑Δ𝑑𝑑]}, a vector set 𝐺𝐺 = {𝜇𝜇1, … ,𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘},𝜇𝜇 ∈ ℝ10 and  ⊕ denoting 
Minkovski addition, the total set of trajectory bundles for coverage of 
the nominal set point space is defined: 
ℜ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = �𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓1 (0), … ,𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁 (0)� ≔ 𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 × 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 × 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤1 × 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤2 ⊕ 𝐺𝐺 (4.4) 
The sampling of 𝐼𝐼𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 × 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 defines a two-dimensional surface of 
steady-states. The set 𝐺𝐺 adds a certain width in the dimensions 
𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 ,𝜔𝜔, 𝛿𝛿 to each tile on the surface, in order to allow the nominal set 
point to digress slightly from the steady-state. The resulting structure 
is visualized in fig. 6.  
 
Fig. 6: Projection of 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓
𝑖𝑖 (0) sets (nominal set point sets) 
 
Using the values 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 10𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠, ∆𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 = 1𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠, 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥,𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 = 20𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠, 
𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = −4𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠2, ∆𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 = 1𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠2, 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥,𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 = 2𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠2, 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = −4𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠2, 
∆𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦 = 1𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠2, 𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦,𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 4𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠2, as well as three intervals for 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤1 , 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤2  
each, a cardinality of #ℜ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 6237 nominal set point bundles is 
achieved. Thereby the operational region for nominal driving is 
constrained to 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 ∈ [10,20]𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠 for this study. In the current set up, it 
is difficult to extend the region to lower velocities, as the dynamic 
bicycle model is hard to analyze with reachability analysis for very 
low velocities.  
To bound the behavior of the disturbed, closed-loop vehicle model, 
when tracking any of the set points 𝜏𝜏(0) ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (0) of the set point 
bundle, the initial deviation of the vehicle state from the set-point has 
to be defined. We chose an initial tracking-error set 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇0 ⊂ ℝ6. Using 
the measurement inaccuracy 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 (sec. 3.2), the combined initial state 
set 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (0) ⊂ ℝ16 is defined as: 
𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (0) ≔ �𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,1:6𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇0𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖                                � (4.5) 
Reachability analysis is then executed for the combined system 
dynamics �𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐T, 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓T �Tand the initial reachable set 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (0), so that for 
each nominal set point tile 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (0) ∈ ℜ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 a motion primitive 𝑚𝑚0𝑖𝑖  is 
constructed and placed in the MDB’s set of initial motion primitives 
𝑀𝑀0. During operation of the vehicle, a nominal set point 𝜏𝜏(0) ∈
𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓
𝑖𝑖 (0) may be selected for execution, if the measured vehicle state 
𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 is inside the assumed tracking error bounds, 𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 −  𝜏𝜏(0) ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇0. 
The validity of transitioning from the nominal set point to a 
subsequent emergency maneuver is automatically guaranteed by the 
following construction of the MDB and does not have to be tested 
during operation. 
It is important to note that the reference system 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 is not stabilized. 
Therefore, the reference trajectories in a set point bundle tend to 
spiral away from each other after a short time, leading to increased 
reachable sets and difficulties in the reachability analysis. 
Fortunately, the necessity to keep the nominal maneuvers short is 
mirrored by the High-Level Behaviors’ requirement to fast switching 
between desired set points. We are thus using short nominal set 
points for a duration of only 0.1 𝑠𝑠 each.  
 
4.2 Sampling the Emergency Maneuver Set Point Space 
In contrast to the nominal maneuvers, emergency maneuvers are 
here defined to use discretely valued (singular) set points and are 
thus comparatively simple. We create a discrete graph with vertices 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑉 and directed edges 𝑒𝑒 ∈ 𝐸𝐸 ⊂ 𝑉𝑉2 as a template for the creation 
of the maneuver automaton. Each vertex 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 = (𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥,𝑖𝑖 ,𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖) represents an 
operating point at maximum absolute acceleration, allocated to 
longitudinal and lateral directions as 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥,𝑖𝑖 ≔ −𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥cos (𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖) and 
𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦,𝑖𝑖 ≔ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥sin (𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖). An edge (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ,𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗) ∈ 𝐸𝐸 defines a trajectory, which 
steers from the operating point �𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥,𝑖𝑖 ,𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖� to �𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥,𝑗𝑗 ,𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗�. The idea, which 
was already pursued in [12], is to concentrate on maximum 
acceleration trajectories, if the number of selectable trajectories has 
to be limited. The duration of a trajectory is chosen in order to 
respect input change limitations and to comply to the end point 
velocity. An edge is created for each source node 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 and each target 
acceleration direction 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗. The velocity of the target node 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 is chosen 
in such a way that the duration of the trajectory is inside a desired 
range. For each node below a certain velocity threshold, an edge to 
the standstill node (0,0) is inserted. The resulting graph is visualized 
in fig. 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7: Nominal set point tiles (red) and emergency maneuver grid 
(blue vertices, blue edges for one example vertex). 
 
To apply the graph structure to the MDB, a function is defined, which 
translates an initial reference state 𝜏𝜏(0) and a target vertex into a 
reference trajectory 𝜏𝜏 = 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅�𝜏𝜏(0),𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗� by solving the IVP for 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 with 
appropriately chosen, constant 𝑤𝑤1 𝑤𝑤2. As a concrete parametrization, 
an angular range of 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 ∈ 0.8[−𝜋𝜋,𝜋𝜋] with 11 samples and a velocity 
range with 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 ∈ [6,20]𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠 with a ∆𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥 = 1𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠 subdivision is used. 
 
4.3 Composition of the Maneuver Database  
The main purpose of the maneuver database is to provide fast 
access to formal bounds on the space required for set point 
execution and the admissible order of set point selection. In the 
following offline algorithm this information is assembled. The 
algorithm’s core is a procedure 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ← REACH(Ri𝑆𝑆, 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖), which computes 
the sets of reachable states for the disturbed closed loop system 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐, 
as defined in sec. 3, following a reference trajectory 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖. For each 
motion primitive, reachability analysis begins with an initial set of 
vehicle states Ri𝑆𝑆 ⊂ ℝ6 and then computes the subsequent reachable 
sets 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖[𝑘𝑘], 1 < 𝑘𝑘 < 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, for all sampled time steps. The resulting 
motion primitive 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is supplemented with an over-approximation 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 of 
all potentially covered 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌 positions, based on the reachable sets.  
As defined by eq. (4.3), the choice of the maneuvers’ initial sets Ri𝑆𝑆 is 
essential for the connectivity of the resulting MDB. Previously, an 
algorithm was proposed, which increased the initial set size 
iteratively to re-create the connectivity of a cyclic template graph 
[11]. Here, we consider nominal maneuvers and emergency 
maneuvers separately and make the assumption that an a-cyclic 
graph sufficiently represents possible maneuvers. For nominal 
maneuvers, a connectivity check is postponed to online analysis, as 
it is not safety critical. For emergency operation we assume that 
each motion primitive is a partial braking maneuver, thus always 
reducing the vehicle’s velocity and thereby guaranteeing an a-cyclic 
structure. The proposed algorithm, alg. 1, receives as input the set of 
initial motion primitives 𝑀𝑀0, which represent nominal driving as 
defined in sec. 4.1, as well as the template graph 𝑉𝑉,𝐸𝐸 as defined in 
sec. 4.2. Due to the a-cyclic nature of the template graph, alg. 1 
computes the total set of motion primitives 𝑀𝑀, the set of final motion 
primitives 𝐺𝐺 and the transition function ∆ in one pass through 𝑉𝑉 in the 
order of decreasing velocity, (line 2). For a template node 𝜇𝜇0, all 
incoming motion primitives computed so far are collected, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (line 3) 
and grouped, (line 4). We define a distance metric based on the 
center and the interval hull of the end set 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 of a maneuver 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖. The 
procedure 𝐶𝐶 ← CLUSTER(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), 𝐶𝐶 ∈ ℕ#𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 uses k-means clustering to  
group the incoming motion primitives according to this metric, 
resulting in groups of motion primitives 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  with similar end sets, (line 
6). The vector of indices 𝐶𝐶 links a maneuver 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 to its cluster and the 
associated centroid maneuver 𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶(𝑗𝑗). For a group 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , the hull 𝑅𝑅0𝑐𝑐 of 
the end sets of all associated maneuvers is computed so that 
𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐 ⟹ 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗
𝐹𝐹 ⊆ 𝑅𝑅0
𝑐𝑐 is guaranteed, (line 7). The algorithm then 
attempts to create one motion primitive per edge in the template 
graph, which starts at 𝜇𝜇0: Based on the target velocity and 
acceleration direction of the node 𝜇𝜇1, REF creates a reference 
trajectory as a continuation of the reference trajectory of the group’s 
centroid motion primitive, and a new motion primitive 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 is thus 
created, (line 10). If the reachable sets of 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 guarantee compliance 
with all dynamics constraints, as computed by VALIDATE, 𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 is 
admitted,  (line 11-14). In line 15, connections are created from all 
incoming motion primitives of this group, to all valid outgoing motion 
primitives, as eq. (4.3) is guaranteed by construction, (line 7).  
 
 
Goal motion primitives are created based on their reference velocity 
at the end point. Further post-processing steps may imbue the MDB 
with additional information, as for example a precomputed heuristic 
value for the online graph search, or they could enforce that only 
motion primitives are contained, which eventually lead to a standstill. 
Applying the algorithm to the concrete numbers given above yields a 
database with a total number of #𝑀𝑀 = 12,434 motion primitives and #(𝑀𝑀\𝑀𝑀0\G) = 5,469 intermediate motion primitives.  
 
 𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂_𝐂𝐂𝐌𝐌𝐌𝐌(𝑉𝑉,𝐸𝐸,𝑀𝑀0) 
1 𝑀𝑀 ← 𝑀𝑀0 
2 For each 𝜇𝜇0 ∈ 𝑉𝑉, ordered by 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥(𝜇𝜇0), decreasing  
3  𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ← �𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝑀 | 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡�𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝜇𝜇0��  
4  𝐶𝐶 ← CLUSTER(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) 
5  For each unique 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶  
6   𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ← �𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝐶𝐶(𝑗𝑗) = 𝑐𝑐� 
7   𝑅𝑅0𝑐𝑐 ← HULL��𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹| 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 �� 
8   𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ← { } 
9   For each 𝜇𝜇1 ∈ 𝑉𝑉, if (𝜇𝜇0,𝜇𝜇1) ∈ 𝐸𝐸, then 
10   𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ← REACH �𝑅𝑅0𝑐𝑐 , REF�𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐�,𝜇𝜇1�� 
11   If VALIDATE(𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘), then 
12     𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 ← 𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  ∪ {𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘} 
13     𝑀𝑀 ← 𝑀𝑀 ∪ {𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘} 
14     If 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥(𝜇𝜇1) ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, then 𝐺𝐺 ← 𝐺𝐺 ∪ {𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘} 
15  ∆ ← ∆  ∪ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 × 𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐   
Alg. 1: Computes a maneuver database based on an a-cyclic 
template graph structure and a set of initial motion primitives. 
 
5. Constraints: Interaction and Cooperation 
The purpose of the Constraints module is to supply information to the 
planner, which allows discriminating between admissible and 
inadmissible motions of the vehicle, according to the current traffic 
situation. A set 𝑅𝑅 ⊂ ℝ3 has to be computed, which describes the 
forbidden 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡 region. Besides static constraints resulting from lane 
boundaries, it is especially interesting to consider the forbidden 
region resulting from possible actions of other traffic participants as 
well as the exchange of guarantees between cooperating vehicles, 
which either decrease or increase the size of 𝑅𝑅. The following sec. 
5.1 defines 𝑅𝑅 in a non-cooperative setting, where vehicles do not 
exchange information, but may nonetheless interact without colliding 
(merge into gaps) based on static assumptions. Sec. 5.2 defines a 
cooperation scheme based on contracts between vehicles, as well 
as the changes to 𝑅𝑅, which are required to represent the contracts. 
Sec. 5.3 proposes a C2C-message based realization of the 
cooperation scheme for automated vehicles and 5.4 proposes a 
realization based on implicit communication, in order facilitate a 
certain degree of cooperation between vehicles, where no direct 
communication channel is available, (e.g. between automated 
vehicles and human drivers). 
 
5.1 Conservative Predictions 
It is certainly possible to find conservative bounds on the behavior of 
other traffic participants by considering physically imposed 
acceleration limits only. But, as can be readily imagined, the 
exclusive use of acceleration bounds results in huge reachable sets, 
which cover the entire drivable area after short time. A remedy is to 
introduce additional constraints, as for example in [13], which may 
include speed limits or non-intersection constraints between third-
party vehicles or third-party vehicles and static environment features, 
(e.g. lane boundaries), as well as legal constraints, to structure the 
possible behavior of other traffic participants. For the presented 
approach acceleration limits are further restricted by considering lane 
assignments and road traffic regulations.  
According to §7 (5) StVO, a lane change may only be executed if no 
other traffic participants are endangered and if the lane change has 
been timely and clearly indicated. Interpreting that a vehicle 
executing a lane change has to guarantee safety of the lane change, 
admits the assumption that other vehicles either stick to their lane or 
are already certain about the safety of their lane change. In the 
following, the standard prediction is therefore that vehicles stick to 
their lane, if they do not indicate and if they have not yet begun 
leaving their lane. 
Def. 5.1: A lane with index 𝑘𝑘 out of all lanes 𝐾𝐾 is defined to have a 
shape parametrized by the distance 𝑠𝑠 along the lane center 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘:ℝ →
ℝ2 and a lateral offset 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘(𝑠𝑠) ∈ ℝ2 with 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘(𝑠𝑠) ⊥ 𝜕𝜕𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘(𝑑𝑑) 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 , which extends 
to the lane boundary. A cross section through the lane at 𝑠𝑠 is: 
𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘(𝑠𝑠) ≔ 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘(𝑠𝑠) ⨁ [−1,1] ∙ 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘(𝑠𝑠) (5.1) 
Def. 5.2: A vehicle of possible initial positions 𝑆𝑆0 ⊂ ℝ, initial velocities 
𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆0 ⊂ ℝ, with length 2𝑙𝑙, predicted after 𝑡𝑡0 along a lane 𝑘𝑘, reserves a 
space 𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) at time 𝑡𝑡, if a set of additional constraints Γ = {C1,𝐶𝐶2 … } 
is applied: 
𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡;  𝑡𝑡0, 𝑆𝑆0,𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆0, Γ) ≔ �𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘(𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)⨁ [−𝑙𝑙, 𝑙𝑙])|  𝑡𝑡 > 𝑡𝑡0� Ci ∈ Γ
𝑖𝑖
� (5.2) 
We use the following constraints, in order to fix the initial state and to 
bound the acceleration: 
𝐶𝐶0: 𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡0) ∈ 𝑆𝑆0 ∧ ?̇?𝑠(𝑡𝑡0) ∈ 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆0 (5.3) 
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎: 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≤ ?̈?𝑠(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 (5.4) 
Predictions of type 𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡;  𝑡𝑡0, 𝑆𝑆0,𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆0, {C0,𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎}) extend along the lane 
ad infinitum and thereby prevent any lane changes of the ego vehicle 
to a lane occupied by following, non-communicating or human-
steered cars: Their prediction would invalidate any emergency 
maneuvers reaching 𝑣𝑣 = 0 in the target lane. In order to resolve this 
issue, we demand that each traffic participant maintains an 
emergency maneuver, which could bring it to a standstill under a 
velocity dependent time bound and furthermore that the traffic 
participant must be able to detect a lane change onto its lane early 
enough to react by applying a moderate deceleration 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏. Therefore 
the following, additional constraint on the velocity is defined, using a 
reaction delay 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟, a local speed limit 𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(𝑠𝑠) and the moderate 
braking capability 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 < 0 with 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏: 
𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣: ?̇?𝑠(𝑡𝑡) ≤ max�0, 𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥�𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)� + 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥(0, 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡0 − 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟)� (5.5) 
An interesting question is which values are acceptable for interaction 
with human drivers: Using a high 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 and small |𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏| leads to a 
conservative vehicle automation behavior, whereas low 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 and 
higher |𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏| might overestimate human driving capabilities. 
Def. 5.3: A vehicle 𝑖𝑖 is matched to a lane, if any part of the vehicle 
body intersects with the lane area. Matched lane indices are 
collected in the set 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 ⊂ 𝐾𝐾.  
Def. 5.4: If the state measurement 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 of a vehicle 𝑖𝑖 is attained at 
time 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 with a bounded uncertainty 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 ⊂ ℝ, 𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣 ⊂ ℝ, we define the 
initial sets 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,0 ≔ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑 and 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,0 ≔ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 ⊕ 𝐸𝐸𝑣𝑣.  
Def. 5.5: If vehicle 𝑖𝑖 is matched to multiple lanes 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, the total 
prediction set assumed by vehicle  𝑗𝑗 is the union of the lane based 
predictions, excepting the lane behind vehicle 𝑗𝑗: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒) ≔ � �∅                                                 if 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗 ∧ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 < 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘�𝑡𝑡;  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,0,𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,0, {C0,𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 ,𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎}�      otherwise𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖  (5.6) 
To satisfy the StVO, we require the ego vehicle to use its indicator 
for a duration of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 before it is allowed to traverse to another lane. 
After 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 + 1 or 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 − 1 are added to 𝐾𝐾𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜. If the indicator is 
switched off before entering the adjacent lane, or after leaving the 
previous lane, indices are obviously also removed.  
Fig. 8: A lane change without cooperation requirement: Vehicle 𝑣𝑣2 
can safely merge into the gap between 𝑣𝑣1 and 𝑣𝑣3, as an emergency 
maneuver (2) exists, which is non-intersection with predicted sets 𝑋𝑋�𝑣𝑣1 
(1) and 𝑋𝑋�𝑣𝑣3 (3). 
Def. 5.5: From the perspective of the ego vehicle with index 𝑗𝑗, the 
drivable lane area 𝑀𝑀 and its complement, the forbidden region 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 are 
defined as: 
𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) ≔��𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘(𝑠𝑠)�𝑠𝑠 ≥ 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)�
𝑘𝑘∈Kj , 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) ≔ ℝ3\𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) (5.7) 
Def. 5.6: The total, non-cooperative constraint set used by vehicle 𝑗𝑗 
for planning an emergency maneuver, which starts at 𝑡𝑡0 is therefore 
defined as: 
𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶
𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡0) ≔ FD(𝑡𝑡0) � 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒)
𝑖𝑖∈𝑉𝑉\{𝑗𝑗} ;   with ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑉: 𝑡𝑡0 > 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 (5.8)
This particular definition facilitates non-cooperative lane changes. It 
is based on a global requirement induced by the constraint 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣, which 
limits the size of prediction sets. Depending on the driving 
performance that can be expected from other traffic participants, 
(reaction time and deceleration), the tightness of possible lane 
change maneuvers varies. Fig. 8 shows the prediction sets for 
vehicles 1 and 3 on a lane 𝑘𝑘, which allow vehicle 2 to make a lane 
change to lane 𝑘𝑘. 
5.2 Cooperation 
In order to facilitate cooperation between vehicles, the terms 
reservation, promise, occupied set and promised set are introduced. 
The non-cooperative forbidden set 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 is then augmented with 
constraints, which guarantee safety of vehicle cooperation. 
Def. 5.7: A reservation 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 is a tuple consisting of the reservation id 
𝑟𝑟, the reserving vehicle id 𝑖𝑖, the target lane id 𝑘𝑘, a reservation start 
time 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟,0, acceleration bounds 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 used to refine 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎, an 
initial position set 𝑆𝑆0 and an initial velocity set 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆0: 
𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 ≔ �𝑟𝑟, 𝑖𝑖, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟,0, 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 , 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,0,𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,0� (5.9) 
A reservation 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 is dual to vehicle 𝑖𝑖 claiming an option on the space 
on lane 𝑘𝑘, which is accessible to it at time 𝑡𝑡 according to its latest 
state at time 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒.  
Def. 5.8: At first, the preliminary reservation 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟0 is defined, using a 
lane-based prediction with the modified constraint set Γr =
�𝐶𝐶0,𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 ,𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎�𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟,𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥��: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟0(𝑡𝑡) ≔  𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘�𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟,0,𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,0,𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,0, Γr� (5.10) 
Subsequently, a disjunction is applied, in order to shrink the 
reservation area with newer observations of the vehicle state: If, 
according to the usual lane based prediction, a vehicle 𝑖𝑖 is no longer 
able to attain certain states covered by 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟0, these states do not have 
to be held free by others. 
Def.: Considering a vehicle state measurement at time 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  and a 
prediction based on constraints Γ = {𝐶𝐶0,𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 ,𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎}, the area dedicated to 
a reservation with index 𝑟𝑟 is:  
𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒) ≔  𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟0(𝑡𝑡)  ∩ 𝑋𝑋�𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒), 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒), Γ) (5.11) 
Def. 5.9: The occupied set 𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 of a vehicle 𝑗𝑗 is a set of reservations, 
which the vehicle 𝑗𝑗 is going to honor: 
𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 = �𝜌𝜌1,1,𝜌𝜌2,1,𝜌𝜌1,2, … �  (5.12) 
A vehicle 𝑗𝑗 promises not to plan any emergency maneuvers starting 
at a time 𝑡𝑡0, which would conflict with reservation sets defined by 
reservations in 𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗. In order to maintain invariant safety, a vehicle, 
which wants to add a reservation to its occupied set, has to make 
sure first that it can still construct an emergency maneuver inside the 
augmented forbidden set.  
Def. 5.10: A promise is a tuple consisting of a reservation and the id 
𝑗𝑗 of a vehicle, which promises to honor the reservation: 
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 ≔ �𝑗𝑗,𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖� (5.13) 
Def. 5.11: The set 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 of a vehicle 𝑖𝑖 keeps track of received promises, 
which describe that it is known to vehicle 𝑖𝑖 that other vehicles 𝑗𝑗, ℎ, … 
will honor a certain reservation of vehicle 𝑖𝑖: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = �𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝ℎ,𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 , … � (5.14) 
It must be certain, that vehicles 𝑗𝑗, ℎ, … honor the reservation: 
�𝑗𝑗,𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖� ∈ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ⟹ 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 (5.15) 
Given a state of the set 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 of vehicle 𝑗𝑗, the constraint set used to 
predict vehicle 𝑖𝑖 can be refined: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖�𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗� ≔ 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒) \ � 𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟�𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒�
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗∈𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗  (5.16) 
The cooperation-based forbidden set used by vehicle 𝑗𝑗 for planning 
an emergency maneuver starting at 𝑡𝑡0 is therefore defined as: 
𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶
𝑗𝑗�𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡0,𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗 ,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗� ≔ FD(t) � 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖�𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗�
𝑖𝑖∈𝑉𝑉{𝑗𝑗} � 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒)𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖∈𝑂𝑂𝑗𝑗  (5.16) 
An example of a refined prediction is given in fig. 9: The tighter gap 
between vehicle 1 and 3 becomes accessible to vehicle 2, if vehicle 
1 positively answers the reservation request of vehicle 2. 
Fig. 9: A lane change with cooperation requirement: In order to allow 
vehicle 𝑣𝑣2 to safely merge into the smaller gap between 𝑣𝑣1 and 𝑣𝑣3, a 
reservation 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,2 (1) has to be defined. If 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,2 ∈ 𝑂𝑂1, then {1,𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟,2} ∈ 𝑃𝑃2 is 
admissible, so that 𝑣𝑣2 may plan an emergency maneuver based on 
(2), the augmented prediction 𝑋𝑋�1(𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡1𝑒𝑒,𝑃𝑃2) = 𝑋𝑋�1(𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡1𝑒𝑒)\𝑋𝑋�2𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡0). 
5.3 Cooperation based on C2C Communication 
It is possible to explicitly transmit intentions between vehicles, which 
are automated and equipped with a C2C module. Therefore a 
realization of the cooperation strategy described in sec. 5.2 is 
straightforward. For the message protocol, we define two types of 
messages, Request and Promise. A Request message contains the 
information of a reservation as defined in eq. (5.9). A vehicle sends a 
Request message via broadcast to all vehicles in its vicinity. Each 
vehicle is assumed to be known by a unique id and is able to keep 
track of all request identifiers, it has been using so far. Therefore the 
combination of request id and vehicle ID (𝑟𝑟, 𝑖𝑖), is unique. Recipients 
of a Request message have the option to ignore the Request, or to 
answer it with a Promise message. A request message is not 
answered, if the recipient cannot or does not want to guarantee 
integrity of the reservation. E.g. vehicle 𝑣𝑣3 in fig. 9 could prefer to be 
uncooperative, in order to maintain a steep emergency maneuver.  
A Promise message is realized as a data structure containing the 
three IDs (𝑗𝑗, 𝑟𝑟, 𝑖𝑖). If a recipient of a Request decides to reply with a 
Promise message, it has to test first, whether the continued 
existence of at least one emergency maneuver is guaranteed under 
the tightened constraints. The question can be decided by re-
planning the emergency maneuver under the tightened constraints, 
yet this could incur unwanted computational demands if many 
Requests are received. In our approach we opt to test for 
intersection between the current emergency maneuver and the 
reservation to determine whether they are compatible. The test is 
carried out by the Contract Validation module, see fig. 2. This simpler 
test is guaranteeing correctness, but is more conservative and less 
cooperative than re-planning. Before a Promise message is issued, 
the Supervisor module assures that an entry is made in the 
Occupied set. In this way, eq. (5.15) and therefore safety of the 
cooperation is guaranteed, irrespective of the performance of the 
communication layer. Due to the possibility of message loss, eq. 
(5.15) is not an equivalence relationship. The proposed protocol is 
guaranteeing safety and is also resilient to misuse, as reservations 
are limited in space and are only relevant with respect to the 
reserving vehicle’s actual state.  
 
5.4 Implicit Cooperation 
Usually, human drivers initiate cooperation using gestures and the 
vehicle’s indicators. Easily observable and interpretable to the 
automated vehicle is probably only the indicator. Yet even the 
indicator is an implicit form of communication, as relevant details 
considering start time, start velocity or intended accelerations of a 
lane change cannot be unambiguously derived. In order to 
nonetheless show a degree of cooperation towards unequipped 
vehicles, we create reservation requests, when an active indicator is 
observed: If an unequipped vehicle indicates a lane change ahead of 
the automated vehicle, the automated vehicle creates a virtual 
Request message addressed to itself. The reservation is set to the 
earliest lane-change, which is compatible with the current emergency 
maneuver.  
6. Planning
We use an anytime weighted A* algorithm based on [14], which 
builds a search tree from the motion primitives in the Maneuver 
Database. The concept has been evaluated in [12] and is only 
sketched here. The root node of the search tree is created by 
selecting the nominal set point bundle 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓
𝑖𝑖 , which contains the 
High-level behavior’s desired set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑. The entry-point into the 
MDB is thereby defined. To create edges in the search tree, motion 
primitives are chosen from the transition function ∆ according to their 
predecessor. A motion primitive’s 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡-hull is translated and rotated 
according to the progress made by its predecessors. The 
transformed hull is then tested for intersection with the forbidden set 
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐, using hierarchically applied separating axis tests [15]. In case of 
any intersection, the edge is marked invalid and is discarded. As 
soon as a valid edge with a motion primitive from the goal set 𝐺𝐺 is 
explored, a safe emergency maneuver and therefore a proof of 
safety for the set point 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 has been found.  
Fig. 10: Example of a valid emergency maneuver (green) 
under consideration of a forbidden set 𝑅𝑅 (red).  
The anytime extension is used, in order to give the search a depth-
first bias, as the primary goal is to find any kind of safety proof. While 
the current 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝 time slice is not at its end, the planner refines the 
solution, in order to provide better results in case the emergency 
maneuver should be selected for execution after the next time slice. 
If the planner cannot find a valid emergency maneuver in the current 
time slice, it will break off searching and not provide any update to 
the Dispatcher. The Dispatcher will then automatically switch to 
execution of the previously computed emergency maneuver. 
An example for an emergency maneuver is shown in fig. 10. In the 
given traffic situation, one car is stopped in the lane in front of the 
ego vehicle, and one car is moving in the adjacent (right) lane. The 
maneuver planner is able to compute a valid emergency maneuver, 
which brings the ego-vehicle to a standstill in the adjacent lane. 
7. Conclusion and Outlook
Validation approaches for automated vehicles, which are based 
solely on testing or offline verification are difficult to realize. We 
present a detailed description of an approach to safety analysis for 
cooperative, automated driving, which is based on a combination of 
testing, offline- as well as online-verification. A Supervisor module 
makes use of offline pre-computed results, relates them to the 
current traffic situation and shows whether set points or cooperation 
agreements are safe. While an agreement between two cooperating, 
automated vehicles is rather straight-forward, the cooperation with 
human drivers is difficult: There are no legal guidelines, which driving 
performance can be expected from a human driver, (e.g. reaction 
times). Furthermore, without a direct communication channel, no 
certainty about the intent of human drivers can exist. It is worthwhile 
to further investigate human capabilities as well as implicit 
cooperation based on conservative predictions. The presented 
approach, as well as similar ones, which are making use of over-
approximations are necessarily restrictive on the vehicle behavior. It 
is interesting to further quantify the limitations, which are resulting 
from over-approximative reachability analysis, the finiteness of 
sampled motion primitive sets and the conservative environment 
prediction. 
8. Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support by the 
European Commission project UnCoVerCPS under grant number 
643921 and by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for the 
project CoInCiDE under grant number 623093. 
References 
[1] Kalra, N., Paddock, S., Driving to Safety: How Many Miles of Driving Would It 
Take to Demonstrate Autonomous Vehicle Reliability? RAND Corporation, 
Santa Monica, 2016. 
[2] Colombo, A., Del Vecchio, D., Least Restrictive Supervisors for Intersection 
Collision Avoidance: A Scheduling Approach, IEEE Transactions on Automatic 
Control, vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 1515-1527, 2015. 
[3] Loos, M. S., Platzer, A., Nistor, L., Adaptive Cruise Control: Hybrid, Distributed, 
and now Formally Verified, Proc. of the 17th International Symposium on Formal 
Methods, pp. 42-56, 2011. 
[4] Damm, W., Peter, H. J., Rakow, J., Westphal, B., Can we build it: Formal 
synthesis of control strategies for cooperative driver assistance systems, 
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, vol. 23, pp. 676-725, 2013. 
[5] Althoff, M., Dolan, J. M., Online Verification of Automated Road Vehicles Using 
Reachability Analysis, IEEE Transactions on Robotics, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 903-
918, 2014. 
[6] Jain, V., Heß, D., Löper, C., Frankiewicz, T., Hesse, T.: Hierarchical Approach 
for Safety of Multiple Cooperating Vehicles. Symposium 
Automatisierungssysteme, Assistenzsysteme und eingebettete Systeme für 
Transportmittel, (AAET), Feb. 8./9., Braunschweig, 2017. 
[7] Donges, E., Aspekte der Aktiven Sicherheit bei der Führung von 
Personenkraftwagen. Automobil-Industrie 27, pp. 183-190, 1982. 
[8] Final draft EN 302-636-4-1 v1.2.1, Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular 
Communications; GeoNetworking; Part4: Geographical addressing and point-to-
multipoint communications; Sub-part 1: Media-Independent Functionality. ETSI 
2014. 
[9] Roehm, H., Oehlerking, J., Woehrle, M., Althoff, M., Reachset Conformance 
Testing of Hybrid Automata, Proc. of Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, 
pp. 277-286, 2016. 
[10] Althoff, M., An Introduction to CORA 2015, Proc. of the Workshop on Applied 
Verification for Continuous and Hybrid Systems, 2015. 
[11] Heß, D., Althoff, M., Sattel, T., Formal Verification of Maneuver Automata for 
Parameterized Motion Primitives, Proc. of the IEEE/RSJ International 
Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, pp. 1474-1481, 2014. 
[12] Salvado, J., and Heß, D., Contingency planning for automated vehicles. Proc. of 
IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 
2016.  
[13] Althoff, M., Heß, D., Gambert, F., Road Occupancy Prediction of Traffic 
Participants, Proc. of the 16th International IEEE Conference on Intelligent 
Transportation Systems, pp. 99-105, 2013. 
[14] Hansen, E. A., Zhou, R., Anytime Heuristic Search, Journal of Artificial 
Intelligence Research, vol. 28, pp. 267-297, 2007. 
[15] Gottschalk, S., Ming, C. L., Manocha, D., OBBTree: A hierarchical structure for 
rapid interference detection. Proc. of the 23rd annual conference on Computer 
graphics and interactive techniques. ACM, 1996. 
[16] Werling, M., Ein neues Konzept für die Trajektoriengenerierung und -
stabilisierung in zeitkritischen Verkehrsszenarien. Schriftenreihe des Instituts für 
Angewandte Informatik / Automatisierungstechnik, KiT, Band 34, 2010. 
